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GUN CONTROL THROUGH TORT LAW 
Richard C. Ausness* 
INTRODUCTION 
I have been asked to respond to an article by Professor Andrew Jay 
McClurg that recently appeared in the Florida Law Review.1 In this 
article, the author, a longtime advocate of firearms regulation,2 argues 
that owners and commercial sellers of firearms who negligently fail to 
secure them against theft should be held liable when persons are killed or 
injured by firearms used in the commission of a crime.3 
In the past, believing that existing federal and state laws were 
inadequate to halt the spread of gun-related deaths and injuries, 
proponents of stricter gun control measures proposed a number of tort 
liability theories to supplement these laws. I will briefly review some of 
these theories in order to provide a background for my discussion of 
Professor McClurg’s proposal. In the early days, when the emphasis was 
on controlling cheap handguns known as “Saturday Night Specials,” gun 
control advocates urged that these firearms be subjected to strict products 
liability.4 However, the strict liability approach usually failed because 
plaintiffs were unable to prove that the handguns in question were 
defective.5 Proponents of gun control then endorsed a broad risk-utility 
or product category liability theory, which characterized products as 
defective if their overall social costs outweighed their social benefits.6 
                                                                                                                 
 * Associate Dean for Faculty Research & Everett H. Metcalf, Jr. Professor of Law. 
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 1. See Andrew Jay McClurg, The Second Amendment Right to be Negligent, 68 FLA. L. 
REV. 1 (2016). 
 2. See, e.g., ANDREW JAY MCCLURG & BRANNON P. DENNING, GUNS AND THE LAW: CASES, 
PROBLEMS AND EXPLANATION (2016); GUN CONTROL AND GUN RIGHTS (Andrew Jay McClurg, 
David B. Kopel & Brannon P. Denning eds. 2002); Andrew Jay McClurg, In Search of the Golden 
Mean in the Gun Debate, 58 HOWARD L.J. 779 (2015); Andrew Jay McClurg, Firearms Policy 
and the Black Community: Rejecting the “Wouldn’t You Want a Gun If Attacked?” Argument, 45 
CONN. L. REV. 1773 (2013). 
 3. See McClurg, supra note 1, at 47. 
 4. See Andrew Jay McClurg, Strict Liability for Handgun Manufacturers: A Reply to 
Professor Oliver, 14 U. ARK.-LITTLE ROCK L.J. 511, 525 (1992). 
 5. See, e.g., Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1210–11 (N.D. Tex. 
1985); Mavilia v. Stoeger Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D. Mass. 1983); Penelas v. Arms Tech., 
Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 6. See Carl Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products 
Liability, 60 MO. L. REV. 1, 9 (1995); Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product 
Category Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 
1429, 1454 (1994); Michael J. Toke, Note, Categorical Liability for Manifestly Unreasonable 
Designs: Why the Comment d Caveat Should Be Removed from the Restatement (Third), 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1185 (1996). 
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After some initial successes,7 this theory was also rejected.8 Finally, some 
gun control proponents urged courts to treat handgun use as an 
ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity,9 but this suggestion was 
not particularly well received either.10 
Recently, the focus has shifted from cheap handguns to military-style 
assault rifles.11 This, in turn, has led gun control advocates to recast 
existing liability theories such as negligent entrustment and public 
nuisance and to formulate new ones such as negligent marketing. 
Negligent entrustment imposes liability on one who supplies a product to 
another when he or she has reason to suspect that the recipient will not be 
able to use it safely.12 Another theory is public nuisance,13 which allows 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See Kelly v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1147 (Md. 1985); see also Halphen v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 114 (La. 1986); O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 
298, 306 (N.J. 1983). 
 8. See Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533–34 (11th Cir. 1986); 
Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1986); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 
1250, 1273–74 (5th Cir. 1985); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.M. 1987), 
aff’d, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988); Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1987). Many commentators were also critical. See, e.g., Harvey M. Grossman, Categorical 
Liability: Why the Gates Should Be Kept Closed, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 385, 398 (1995); James A. 
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The 
Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1266–67 (1991). 
 9. See John L. Diamond, Eliminating the “Defect” in Design Strict Products Liability 
Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 529, 537, 544, 547 (1983); Andrew Jay McClurg, Handguns as 
Products Unreasonably Dangerous Per Se, 13 U. ARK.-LITTLE ROCK L.J. 599, 601, 603, 604 
(1991); Andrew O. Smith, Comment, The Manufacture and Distribution of Handguns as an 
Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 370 (1987). 
 10. See, e.g., Shipman, 791 F.2d at 1534; Moore, 789 F.2d at 1328; Perkins, 762 F.2d at 
1268; Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir. 1984); Caveny v. 
Raven Arms Co., 665 F. Supp. 530, 531 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff’d, 849 F.2d 406 (6th Cir. 1988); 
Armijo, 656 F. Supp. at 775, aff’d, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988); Hammond v. Colt Indus. 
Operating Corp., 565 A.2d 558, 563 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989); Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1147; Knott v. 
Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 664–65 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). Contra Richman v. 
Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 208 (E.D. La. 1983). 
 11. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 152 & nn.2–3 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1999), rev’d, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001). This cases involved the TEC-9 and the TEC-DC9. These 
military-style semi-automatic weapons were designed to accept fifty-round magazines and were 
equipped with “barrel shrouds” that facilitated spray fire. In addition, the barrels were threaded in 
order to accept silencers or flash suppressors. The weapons were compact and could be easily 
broken down and concealed. Furthermore, they were fitted with a “Hell Fire” trigger mechanism 
that enabled them to be fired more rapidly than other semi-automatic weapons. Finally, the TEC-
DC9 could be easily converted to fire like an automatic weapon. See id. at 154–55. 
 12. See McClurg, supra note 1, at 10 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 
(AM. LAW INST. 1965)). 
 13. See Bhowmik et al., A Sense of Duty: Retiring the “Special Relationship” Rule and 
Holding Gun Manufacturers Liable for Negligently Distributing Guns, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. & 
POL’Y 42, 58 (2001); John G. Culhane & Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Defining a Proper Role for 
Public Nuisance Law in Municipal Suits Against Gun Sellers: Beyond Rhetoric and Experience, 
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states and cities to recover from gun manufacturers for health care, law 
enforcement and other expenses incurred by the government because of 
the defendant’s irresponsible marketing practices.14 This theory has been 
accepted in some states15 and rejected in others.16 Negligent marketing is 
a novel theory that emerged during this period.17 Negligent marketing 
seeks to impose liability for promotional and marketing practices that 
facilitate access to guns by criminals and other unsuitable persons.18 
However, so far courts have been reluctant to hold gun manufacturers or 
sellers liable under this theory.19 
In contrast, Professor McClurg’s liability proposal is more traditional 
and narrowly focused than the approaches discussed above. In the first 
place, because it is based on negligence, this liability theory requires that 
the defendant be at fault in some way. Second, it does not affect gun 
manufacturers at all, but instead imposes liability on gun owners and 
sellers when they fail to secure their weapons properly and when this 
failure enables criminals to steal guns and injure third parties while 
committing violent crimes. However, I am skeptical about whether the 
imposition of tort liability is the best solution to the problem of gun 
violence. 
I.  TORT LIABILITY AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
Professor McClurg correctly points out that court and legislative 
bodies have generally refused to impose tort liability on owners or 
                                                                                                                 
52 S.C. L. REV. 287, 301 (2001); David Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the 
Elements and Underlying Policies of Public Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (2000). 
 14. See 2 DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PROD. LIAB. § 10:9 (4th 
ed. 2016); Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public Nuisance?, 77 
TEMP. L. REV. 825, 870 (2004). 
 15. See, e.g., City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 401 F. Supp. 2d 244, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005); White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 819 (N.D. Ohio 2000); District of Columbia 
v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 637 (D.C. 2005); City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 
801 N.E.2d 1222, 1249 (Ind. 2003); James v. Arms Tech Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 50 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2003); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1140 (Ohio 2002).  
 16. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F.3d 415, 420–21 (3d Cir. 
2002); Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 540–41 
(3d Cir. 2001); Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); 
Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 543 S.E.2d 16, 19 (Ga. 2001). 
 17. See Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale of Non-Defective Products: An 
Analysis and Critique of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L. REV. 907, 912 (2002). 
 18. See Andrew Jay McClurg, The Tortious Marketing of Handguns: Strict Liability Is 
Dead, Long Live Negligence, 19 SETON H. LEGIS. J. 777, 778–79 (1995). 
 19. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Merrill v. Navegar, 
Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 124, 125 (Cal. 2001); Riordan v. Int’l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1294, 
1296 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); 
Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 664, 665 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). 
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commercial sellers of firearms.20 For example, no federal or state law 
requires gun owners to securely store their weapons to prevent theft from 
homes or motor vehicle.21 Furthermore, while the Federal Bureau of 
Alcohol, Firearms and Tobacco (AFT) has issued detailed 
recommendations to commercial sellers regarding the proper storage of 
firearms, none of these recommendations are mandatory.22  
Moreover, as Professor McClurg observes, courts have also been 
reluctant to impose tort liability on either gun owners or commercial 
sellers for failing to secure firearms against theft.23 Although courts have 
declared firearms to be dangerous and have urged owners to exercise the 
highest degree of care when storing and using them,24 they usually stop 
short of holding gun owners and commercial sellers liable for negligent 
storage of firearms by invoking “those wayward twins of different 
mothers, duty and proximate cause, along with their shady cousin, 
foreseeability.”25 Valentine v. On Target, Inc.26 is illustrative of the duty 
analysis. In that case, an unknown assailant used a gun stolen from the 
defendant gun store to murder the decedent.27 The court accused the 
plaintiff of seeking to impose a duty on the defendant to protect the world 
at large from criminal activity—a duty which it felt would impose a 
“tremendous burden” on gun dealers while providing only a hypothetical 
benefit to the public.28 
Courts also rely on proximate cause (or the lack thereof) to protect 
gun owners and sellers from liability. When a court decides a case on 
proximate cause grounds, it usually considers whether the defendant’s 
negligent conduct was a foreseeable cause of the plaintiff’s injury. In such 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See McClurg, supra note 1, at 4–6. 
 21. See id. at 17. Congress did enact the Child Safety Lock Act in 2005, which requires gun 
makers and sellers to furnish a secure storage or safety device to prevent children from gaining 
access to firearms. See 18 U.S.C. § 921 (34) (A), (B), (C) (2012). However, this statute is 
concerned with preventing harm to children rather than preventing the theft of firearms. See 
McClurg, supra note 1, at 18. In addition, about twenty-five states have enacted child access 
prevention (CAP) laws, which impose criminal liability on gun owners who negligently store their 
firearms if this enables a child to obtain access to a weapon and cause him to himself or another. 
See id. at 18–19. 
 22. See id. at 19–20. Moreover, only nine states and the District of Columbia impose 
security requirements on gun dealers. Id. at 20 n.91. 
 23. See id. at 23; see also Jones v. Secord, 684 F.3d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 2012); Bridges v. Parish, 
742 S.E.2d 794, 796 (N.C. 2013). 
 24. See Bridges v. Dahl, 108 F.2d 228, 229 (6th Cir. 1939); Reida v. Lund, 96 Cal. Rptr. 
102, 105 (Ct. App. 1971); Jacobs v. Tyson, 407 S.E.2d 62, 64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); Long v. Turk, 
962 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Kan. 1998); Estate of Strever v. Cline, 924 P.2d 666, 671 (Mont. 1996); 
Stoelting v. Hauck, 159 A.2d 385, 389 (N.J. 1960); Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral Co., 18 S.E.2d 
412, 417 (N.C. 1942).  
 25. McClurg, supra note 1, at 23 (citations omitted). 
 26. 727 A.2d 947 (Md. 1999). 
 27. See id. at 948. 
 28. See id. at 951. 
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cases, courts often conclude that the actions of third party criminals are 
unforeseeable and, therefore, break the chain of causation, thereby 
relieving the defendant of liability.29 For example, in Romero v. National 
Rifle Association,30 a gun stolen from the NRA’s national headquarters 
was used to murder the decedent during a robbery.31 Affirming a decision 
for the defendant, the federal court of appeals declared that the events 
were so “extraordinary and unforeseeable” that they constituted a 
superseding cause.32 
According to Professor McClurg, when courts invoke principles of 
proximate cause and duty in stolen gun cases without considering the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct, they are essentially 
concluding that public policy does not require gun owners and sellers to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent gun thefts.33 Professor McClurg also 
believes that these decisions reflect a view that imposing liability on gun 
owners and sellers in these cases will have a chilling effect on gun 
ownership and thereby raise Second Amendment concerns.34 However, 
Professor McClurg persuasively argues that “nothing in the history nor 
jurisprudence of the Second Amendment suggests, much less guarantees, 
a privilege by gun sellers and owners to act unreasonably in securing 
firearms from theft.”35 
II.  THE ARGUMENT FOR TORT LIABILITY 
There are two aspects to Professor McClurg’s argument for tort 
liability. First, he contends that the aggregate social harm (deaths and 
injuries) attributable to gun theft justifies measures to coerce, or at least 
to encourage, gun owners and sellers to take more precautions to prevent 
theft. Second, the imposition of tort liability will have a sufficient 
deterrent effect to achieve this goal.  
A.  Costs and Benefits 
1.  The Benefits of Reducing Gun Deaths and Injuries  
Professor McClurg’s cost-benefit analysis requires a reasonably 
accurate calculation of both costs and benefits. Although it seems a bit 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See Romero v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., 749 F.2d 77, 80–81 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 
Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 674; Louria v. Brummett, 916 S.W.2d 929, 930–31 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1995). 
 30. 749 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 31. See id. at 78. 
 32. See id. at 80–81. 
 33. See McClurg, supra note 1, at 24. 
 34. See id. at 29–30 (discussing McGrane v. Cline, 973 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1999) and Holden v. Johnson, No. CV010811660 WL 1153739 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2005)). 
 35. Id. at 10. 
94 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 68 
 
strange to frame it this way, the “benefits” of imposing tort liability on 
gun owners and sellers would be the reduction in the costs of deaths and 
injuries caused by stolen guns that would result if they were subjected to 
tort liability. In order to ascertain that figure, we must determine: (1) what 
these aggregate costs are; and (2) how much they would be reduced if the 
tort liability option were chosen. Unfortunately, neither of these figures 
are easy to determine.  
Professor McClurg observes that more than 30,000 deaths36 and 
80,000 nonfatal injuries37 are caused each year by firearms. Although 
some of these deaths and injuries are accidental, others result from either 
self-inflicted gunshots or homicides.38 According to one survey, as many 
as 600,000 guns may have been stolen each year from private residences 
through burglaries and other property crimes.39 In addition, thousands of 
guns are stolen from commercial sellers as the result of shoplifting and 
burglaries.40 Many of these stolen guns are no doubt used to commit 
violent crimes resulting in deaths or injuries.41 Nevertheless, while many 
of these deaths and injuries committed by criminals involve stolen 
firearms,42 we cannot be sure what the actual numbers are.43 Moreover, 
even if we could obtain an accurate estimate of these deaths and injuries, 
we would have to “monetize” them in order to balance them with the cost 
side of the equation. 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. at 21 (citing Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, NAT’L VITAL 
STAT. REP., May 8, 2013, at 1, 11, 83 tbl. 18, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf). 
 37. Id. at 38 (citing Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS), 
Nonfatal Injury Reports 2001–2013, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION). 
 38. See id. at 21 n.97. 
 39. See id. at 11 (citing PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUNS IN 
AMERICA: NATIONAL SURVEY ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND USE OF FIREARMS 7 (1997), 
https://www.ncjrs. gov/pdffiles/165476.pdf).  
 40. See id. at 12 (citing BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 2012 SUMMARY: FIREARMS REPORTED LOST AND STOLEN 10 tbl.3 (2013), 
https://www.atf.gov/file/11846/download). 
 41. See id. at 14. 
 42. See id. at 13–14 and accompanying notes. 
 43. Professor McClurg cites a study that concluded that about 61% of all gun-related deaths 
in 2010 were the result of suicides and 35% were the result of homicides. Id. at 21 n.97 (citing 
Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., May 8, 2013 at 
1, 11, 83 tbl. 18, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_04.pdf). The reason that the 
suicide death rate is so high is because of the lethality of guns as a suicide method.  In fact, guns 
are the most lethal form of suicide, with an 82 percent success rate. See Lethality of Suicide 
Methods, HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/means-matter/means-
matter/case-fatality/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).  This also suggests that a high percentage of non-
fatal gun injuries result from criminal acts. 
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2.  The Costs of Tort Liability 
Even if the benefits of tort liability could be determined with 
reasonable certainty, the analysis would not be complete without 
considering what the cost of tort liability would be. This cost could be 
significant because the imposition of tort liability would potentially affect 
all gun owners and sellers and result in inconvenience and out-of-pocket 
expenses to secure their weapons against theft. Another potential cost is 
the inability of gun owners to immediately access their weapons to defend 
against robberies and burglaries.44 As in the case of benefits, the cost side 
of the equation must be monetized to that both costs and benefits can be 
compared using the same metrics. Unfortunately, as is the case with 
benefits, many of the costs of tort liability cannot be accurately 
monetized. 
3.  The Deterrent Effect of Tort Law  
Finally, there is the question of whether tort law would actually deter 
negligent conduct on the part of gun owners and sellers.45 Professor 
McClurg relies on what he calls an “economic deterrence model” to 
support his argument for tort liability.46 As he points out, tort rules are 
intended to encourage actors to expend resources on safety up to the point 
where the marginal cost of safety equals the marginal reduction in 
accident costs.47 Tort liability forces actors to internalize the social costs 
of their activities and, thereby, gives them an incentive to avoid incurring 
these costs by engaging in safer conduct.48 In other words, individuals 
and business entities who are “rational actors” will seek to avoid liability 
by investing in safety and thereby reducing accident costs. But will they? 
Unfortunately, not everyone behaves according to the rational actor 
model. Professor Stephen Sugarman examined the effect of tort liability 
on human behavior in an influential article entitled Doing Away with Tort 
Law.49 First, Professor Sugarman pointed out that “[s]elf-preservation 
instincts, market forces, personal morality and governmental regulation 
combine to control unreasonably dangerous actions independently of tort 
law.”50 Furthermore, he identified a number of factors that weakened the 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See id. at 41. 
 45. If tort law does not significantly deter negligent conduct, gun-related deaths and injuries 
will not be reduced as much as predicted. If this occurred, the benefit side of the risk-utility 
equation would be correspondingly reduced. 
 46. See id. at 38. 
 47. See id.; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of 
Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 865–72 (1981). 
 48. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government 
Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1289 (1980). 
 49. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555 (1985). 
 50. Id. at 561. 
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deterrent effects of tort liability for particular individuals. For example, 
he observed that many people were ignorant of the liability rules that 
affected them.51 In addition, both individuals and organizations often 
suffered from what Professor Sugarman refers to as “incompetence.”52 
On an individual level, this means inattention or lapses in judgment; at 
the organizational level, it means the inability to formulate a strategy to 
limit exposure to liability or to implement it throughout the organization’s 
structure.53 According to Professor Sugarman, the deterrent effect of tort 
law was further weakened by the fact that people often disregarded the 
threat of liability.54 Another factor was the fact that some people were 
willing to take chances, even though they realized that they are placing 
others at risk, when they believed that these risks were necessary to 
achieve some important goal.55 Furthermore, some people were not 
deterred by tort liability because they felt that the risk of being held liable 
was very low.56 Finally, some people were not deterred by tort liability 
because they were judgment proof or because they were protected by 
liability insurance.57 
III.  REGULATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO TORT LIABILITY 
If the benefits of reduced deaths and injuries from stolen guns 
resulting from the threat of tort liability do not clearly outweigh the costs 
of imposing such liability on gun owners and sellers, perhaps we should 
consider whether some of these benefits can be achieved more cheaply 
by imposing certain theft prevention measures by regulation instead of 
relying on tort liability.   
There are a number of reasons why government regulation is likely to 
be cheaper and more efficient than tort liability.58 First of all, regulatory 
standards are easier to understand ex ante because they are usually 
specific.59 In contrast, tort rules tend to be open-ended and contextual in 
nature.60 In the case of federal regulations, another advantage is they 
                                                                                                                 
 51. See id. at 565–67. 
 52. Id. at 561, 568. 
 53. See id. at 568–69. 
 54. See id. at 569. 
 55. See id. at 570. 
 56. See id.  
 57. See id. at 571–74. 
 58. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An 
Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437, 
1468 (1994). 
 59. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective Product Design: A 
Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. REV. 625, 638 (1978). 
 60. See Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a “Strong” Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 
MD. L. REV. 1210, 1262 (1996). 
2017] GUN CONTROL THROUGH TORT LAW 97 
 
apply uniformly throughout the country.61 Furthermore, regulatory 
agencies typically have a number of effective enforcement powers to 
enable them to enforce their rules and regulations,62 while the tort system 
relies almost entirely on private individuals for enforcement.63 In 
addition, when viewed broadly as a mechanism for risk control, the 
“overhead” costs of a regulatory approach are likely to be less than the 
costs of tort liability.64 While the costs of government regulation include 
the cost of maintaining an agency staff, as well as the cost of formulating 
and enforcing regulations, the costs of tort liability not only include the 
cost of determining applicable tort law safety standards,65 but also the 
cost of defending and adjudicating damage claims.66  
If a regulatory route is chosen, an obvious place to start would be a 
statutory authorization for the ATF to convert some or all of its existing 
recommendations into binding regulations on gun sellers.67 Regulation of 
gun owners at the federal level would be more problematic. Although a 
federal gun safety law aimed at individual gun owners would no doubt be 
more effective than state regulation, it would raise Second Amendment 
concerns and would probably also generate considerable opposition from 
the NRA and the rest of the “gun lobby.” Therefore, a more practical 
approach would be to modify state CAP laws, currently found in at least 
twenty-five states,68 and impose specific theft-prevention obligations on 
gun owners.69 In fact, it might be possible for interested parties, including 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution for Product 
Liability Crises: Uniform Federal Tort Law Standards, 64 DENV. U. L. REV. 685, 692 (1988). 
 62. See Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 175, 177 (1989). 
 63. For example, the deterrent effect of tort law is weakened because many injured parties 
fail to sue. See Robert A. Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski, “Tort Reform” and the Liability 
“Revolution”: Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 251, 
259 (1991–1992).  
 64. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An 
Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437, 
1450 (1994). 
 65. See Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, A Permanent Solution for Product 
Liability Crises: Uniform Federal Tort Law Standards, 64 DENV. U. L. REV. 685, 692 (1988). 
 66. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 
357, 363-64 (1984). Both plaintiffs and defendants bear these costs. According to one estimate, 
the overhead costs of tort litigation are almost fifty cents on every dollar spent to pay claims. See 
JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 
69 (1986). 
 67. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SAFETY AND SECURITY INFORMATION FOR FEDERAL FIREARMS LICENSEES 8–15 (2010) (discussed 
in McClurg, supra note 1, at 19 n.89. 
 68. See McClurg, supra note 1, at 18 n.80. 
 69. Professor McClurg points out that current CAP laws do not require specific safety 
measures, but merely make it a crime to negligently store a loaded firearm in a way that enables 
98 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 68 
 
the NRA and other gun-oriented organizations, to formulate a uniform 
gun safety law, which, if adopted, would help to avoid the problem of 
disparate regulations at the state level. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor McClurg rightly points out that many gun owners and 
sellers do not take adequate measures to protect against theft. This failure 
contributes to gun-related deaths and injuries because stolen firearms are 
often used in the commission of other crimes. Professor McClurg laments 
the fact that current laws and court decisions have immunized gun owners 
and sellers from liability in such cases and he proposes to remedy the 
situation by imposing tort liability on those who negligently fail to 
safeguard their weapons against theft. While this proposal has some 
merit, a tort liability regime may not have a significant deterrent effect 
and will be costly to administer. Consequently, I have suggested that a 
regulatory approach should be considered instead. Existing ATF 
recommendations could be made mandatory on commercial gun sellers 
at the federal level, while gun safety measures could be enforced against 
individual gun owners under state law.  
 
                                                                                                                 
a child to gain access to the weapon and cause harm to himself or another person. See id. at 18–
19. 
